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The constitutional conundrum of the European 
Union: Sources, features and outcomes 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The Lisbon Treaty is the expression of several constitutional compromises. The compromise between 
different (supranational and intergovernmental) views of the Union, the compromise between member 
states engaged in building the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and those allowed to opt-out of it 
and the compromise, within the EMU, between a centralized approach to monetary policy and 
decentralized economic policies. The euro crisis has called into question this multiple constitutional 
compromises. The balance between supranational and intergovernmental views has been upset in 
favour of the former. The approval of new intergovernmental treaties has formalized the separation of 
interests between EMU and opt-out member states. The voluntary coordination between national 
governments has brought to hierarchical inter-state relations in economic governance. The European 
Union has entered a constitutional conundrum. Two outcomes of the conundrum are thus considered: 
the renewal of an internal differentiated EU and the formation of different organizations, although the 
management of the conundrum through a muddling-through approach might emerge as the only viable 
strategy. 
 
Keywords:  
Euro crisis, Lisbon Treaty, constitutional compromises, differentiation, treaty reform 
 
 
Résumé :  
Le traité de Lisbonne repose sur plusieurs compromis constitutionnels : un compromis entre 
différentes conceptions de l’Union (supranationale et inter-gouvernementale) ; un compromis entre les 
États membres prenant part à la construction de l’union économique et monétaire (UEM) et ceux qui 
n’y participent pas ; enfin un compromis, au sein de l’UEM, entre une approche centralisée de la 
politique monétaire et des politiques économiques décentralisées. La crise de l’Euro a mis en question 
l’enchevêtrement de ces compromis constitutionnels. L’équilibre entre les conceptions supranationale 
et intergouvernementale a été brisé au profit de la première. Dans le même temps, l’adoption de 
nouveaux traités intergouvernementaux a consacré la divergence d’intérêts entre les Etats membres 
de l’UEM et les autres. Le choix d’une coordination entre gouvernements nationaux a conduit à une 
hiérarchisation des relations interétatiques au sein de la gouvernance économique. La « boîte noire » 
constitutionnelle ainsi générée a eu deux conséquences au sein de l’Union Européenne (UE) : le 
renouveau d’une différenciation interne à l’UE, et la formation d’organisations divergentes. La seule 
stratégie envisageable pourrait bien alors consister en une gestion au cas par cas de la fameuse 
« boîte noire ». 
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Crise européenne, traité de Lisbonne, compromis constitutionnels, différentiation, réforme du traité 
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Introduction  
The euro crisis has radically called into question the constitutional system of the 
European Union (EU) as formalized by and in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (Craig 2010), 
bringing the EU into a constitutional conundrum. The article will investigate the source of 
the conundrum for thus discussing its plausible outcomes. The EU constitutional system 
was based on a plurality of constitutional compromises. First, the compromise between a 
supranational union (in charge of single market policies) and an intergovernmental union 
(in charge of those policies traditionally close to national sovereignty, such as, inter alia, 
the policies of the Economic and Monetary Union or EMU). Second, the compromise 
between EMU countries (that is the member states adopting the single currency, the euro, 
or engaged in meeting the macro-economic criteria for adopting it, the ‘pre-ins’) and 
member states retaining their own national currency (because allowed to opt-out from the 
EMU, the so-called ‘outs’). Third, the compromise, within the euro-area, between the 
centralization of monetary policy by a supranational institution (the European Central Bank 
or ECB) and the decentralization of economic, fiscal and budgetary policies in the member 
states, subject to the voluntary coordination of their governments.  
To meet the existential challenges posed by the euro crisis (Menendez 2013), the EU, 
since 2010, has approved a panoply of new legislatives measures through the procedures 
established by the Lisbon Treaty, but a number of EU member states have also approved 
new intergovernmental treaties (the 2011 European Stability Mechanism or ESM, the 2012 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
the so-called Fiscal Compact and, last but not least, the 2014 Single Resolution Fund or 
SRF negotiated in the context of the banking union) outside of the Lisbon Treaty, besides 
executive agreements (as the 2010 European Financial Stability Facility or EFSF and the 
2011 Euro Plus Pact), binding only the signatory member states. These legislative 
measures, intergovernmental treaties and special purpose’s agreements have upset the 
multi-layer structure of constitutional compromises. The EU has entered a true 
constitutional conundrum. Which might its plausible outcomes be? 
Here, I will proceed as follows: In section 1, I will analyze the constitutional 
compromises that have structured the Lisbon Treaty, considered as the sources of the 
conundrum. In section 2, I will discuss the consequences of the euro crisis on the multi-
layer structure of constitutional compromises, identified as the features of the institutional 
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and legal disorder emerged within and outside the EU. In section 3, I will thus consider the 
outcomes of the conundrum. Finally, I will draw some conclusions from the analysis.   
 
1. The constitutional compromises of the Lisbon Treaty 
The Maastricht’s dual constitutional models 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty officially established that the economic and financial policy 
of the EU would be defined and regulated within a decision-making regime that was 
intergovernmental in nature. The Maastricht Treaty was necessarily conditioned by the 
historical context within which it was negotiated and then signed by the member states on 
7 February 1992. Organized after the end of the Cold War, the intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) held in Maastricht in 1991 had to deal inevitably with issues 
unconnected with the single market (Baun 1995-96). In that IGC, it was decided to bring 
those issues within the integration process, but on the condition that they should be strictly 
controlled by member state governments. Thus, the Treaty introduced an institutional 
differentiation that promoted different decision-making methods for dealing with different 
policy areas. Three distinct pillars were created, organized according to different decision-
making regimes.   
The homogeneous character of the supranational entity that emerged from the 
previous decades was thus altered through the formation of different institutional settings 
separate one from the other. In fact, since the Rome Treaties of 1957, the Union 
developed through the so-called ‘Community method’ (Dehousse 2011) based on the idea 
that decision-making power has to be shared between supranational institutions (as the 
Commission - with its monopoly of legislative initiative - and later the European Parliament 
or EP - become a true co-decisional legislature) and the intergovernmental institutions 
(represented by the Council of Ministers or Council - the other co-decisional legislature - 
and the informal European Council of the heads of state and government, considered as 
one of the Council’s configurations – with the role of defining the long-term strategies of 
the Union, Eggermont 2012). This supranational union was not considered the solution for 
solving the problems emerging with the end of the Cold War. In that historical context, the 
member states introduced an alternative constitutional model of integration for governing 
the policies traditionally close to national sovereignty. Those policies were Europeanized 
but kept under the control of the collectivity of national governments (as represented by 
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the Council and the European Council, with a limited involvement of the supranational 
institutions of the Commission and EP). It was also established that, in those policies, 
integration would have to proceed through political, more than legal, acts. Since integration 
could not take place through law, in those policies the role of the European Court of 
Justice or ECJ (whose power was and has continued to be crucial in the supranational 
constitution) would have been curtailed. The two constitutional models (the old 
supranational and the new intergovernmental ones) reflected two different views of the 
political union being promoted in Europe (Laursen and Vanhoonocker 1992). The 
Maastricht Treaty formalized the compromise between political supranationalism and 
political intergovernmentalism. 
The Lisbon Treaty abolished the structure of the pillars formalized in the Maastricht 
Treaty, but it kept the two different decision-making regimes distinct. In the management of 
public policies linked to the internal market, the Lisbon Treaty continues to prescribe a 
constitutional model where the decision-making power is shared by multiple institutions 
through the Community method. At the same time, for policies that have traditionally been 
sensitive to national sovereignty (in our case, economic and financial policies), the Lisbon 
Treaty prescribes a model of intergovernmental constitution where decision-making power 
is pooled in the institutions, the European Council and the Council, representing the 
governments of the Union. The European Council, recognized for the first time as a formal 
institution of the Union led by a permanent president, is the collegial political executive of 
the Union (Fabbrini S. 2013).  
When the financial crisis struck Europe, at the same time as the Lisbon Treaty was 
entering into force, not only was there an intergovernmental constitution for dealing with 
economic policy, but there was also a general consensus that only national governments 
could find solutions for the financial turmoil. As the former French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy said in a speech in Toulon on 1 December 2011: “the reform of Europe is not a 
march towards supra-nationality. (…) The crisis has pushed the heads of state and 
government to assume greater responsibility because ultimately they have the democratic 
legitimacy to take decisions. (…) The integration of Europe will go the intergovernmental 
way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices.”  
 
The compromises between monetary regimes 
6 
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After having accepted the re-unification of Germany in 1990 and in order to keep the 
reunified Germany within a tighter framework, the Maastricht Treaty also set the criteria for 
launching the EMU (Martin and Ross 2004) as the policies’ regime for supporting the 
project of a single currency (Jabko 2006). Certainly the project of the single currency was 
not thrown together in the aftermath of German reunification (Issing 2008). Indeed, it was 
largely defined by a 1988 ad hoc committee, chaired by the then president of the 
Commission Jacques Delors and constituted by the governors of the central banks of the 
then twelve member states. Already in the 1970s, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
currencies exchange system, projects and proposals for promoting a European monetary 
system were advanced and discussed. The Delors Report of 1988 was a solution in 
search for a problem. The problem arrived with the necessity to envelop a reunified 
Germany into a stronger European framework. Through the launch of the common 
currency project it was thought that a reunified Germany would continue to be a European 
Germany.  
The EMU was thus a policy regime with a political, not merely an economic, rationale 
(Dyson and Quaglia 2010). To promote it, a compromise had however to be made with 
member states (as the United Kingdom or UK and then Denmark) willing to preserve their 
national currency. Although celebrated as the economic and monetary regime for all the 
EU member states, the UK and Denmark were allowed to formally opt-out of the obligation 
to convert their national currencies into the new common currency, regardless of their 
macro-economic conditions. Indeed, Denmark, after having rejected the Maastricht Treaty 
in a popular referendum held in 1992, finally came to accept it through a new referendum 
held in 1993 because of the so-called Edinburgh Agreement of December 1992 which 
allowed the country to opt-out of the need to adopt the future common currency. De facto, 
a third member state, Sweden, has been allowed to keep its own national currency, thanks 
to a biased algebraic calculation regularly showing its inability to fulfil the required macro-
economic criteria. The three countries contributed with others in the 1960s to develop a 
project of economic cooperation, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)1, which 
1 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was created in 1960 by seven countries as a looser alternative to the 
then European Economic Community (EEC) established with the 1957 Rome Treaty. It was heir to the Free Trade Area 
(FTA), a project pursued by the UK between 1956-58. The EFTA as a trade bloc was established by the Stockholm 
Convention held on 4 January 1960 in the Swedish capital. The founding members of EFTA were Austria, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  During the 1960s, these countries were often referred to as the 
Outer Seven, as opposed to the Inner Six of the then-EEC. Most of its membership has since joined the EEC and then 
the EU. At the end of 2012, EFTA was constituted by four countries: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.  
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was in turn heir to the Free Trade Area (FTA), the alternative project to the one begun with 
the 1952 Paris Treaty and the 1957 Rome Treaties.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty was indeed a symbolic turning point. The semantic change from 
the European Economic Community (EEC) to the European Union, although inclusive of a 
pillar called the European Community (EC), signalled the deepening of the integration 
process. In exchange for accepting the qualitative leap of moving towards a Union, the 
member states interpreting integration as a process to create and preserve an economic 
community (not an economic union) were thus allowed to opt-out of the most integrationist 
policies2. The opting out of undesired legislation or treaty provisions gave those member 
states the right both not to participate in specific policy areas and not to be subject to a 
general jurisdiction in it. Since Maastricht, the opting-out compromise has accompanied 
the process of integration. In addition to Denmark and the UK opting out of adopting the 
euro, UK and Poland have opted-out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Czech 
Republic has joined the two member states in opting out of the Charter with the 2013 
Treaty on the accession of Croatia. Regarding legislation, Denmark, Ireland and the UK 
have opted out of policy regulation in the area of freedom, security and justice. Ireland and 
the UK have opted out of the Schengen agreement on the free circulation of persons 
within the EU. Denmark has opted out of foreign and security policies. At the end of 2013, 
six member states had these opt-outs: UK (four opt-outs), Denmark (four opt-outs), Ireland 
(two opt-outs), Poland (one opt-out), the Czech Republic (one opt-out) and Sweden (one 
opt-out, but only de facto). 
The opting-out of the adoption of the euro had, however, a special character: it 
formalized the existence of different economic constitutions within the EU (Joerges 2014), 
notwithstanding what the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, Art. 3.4) re-asserted, namely that “the Union 
shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro”. Formally, 
 
2 The perspective of the EU as an economic community cannot be confused with that of the EU as an economic union. 
In the EU’s history, the concept of economic union has been connected to monetary union, thus becoming a specific 
system of governance with the EMU. On the contrary, by economic community one has to understand the organization 
of the common market. If one assumes, with Balassa (1961), that regional economic integration advances through four 
basic stages (free trade area, customs union, common market and economic union), then the concept of economic 
community can be located between the second and the third phase, far from the fourth stage. This is why the concept of 
economic union cannot be equated to the concept of economic community. 
 
 
8 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 01/2014 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Sergio Fabbrini – The constitutional conundrum of the European Union 
the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU, Art 139.1) recognizes this possibility only to those member 
states that do not “fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of the euro (and for this 
reason they, n.d.r.) shall hereinafter be referred to as ‘Member States with derogation’”, or 
‘pre-ins.’ This has never been the case for Denmark and UK. Thus, different economic and 
monetary regimes came to coexist in the same project of integration. Within the EMU, 
there were the regimes of the euro-area member states (the ‘ins’) and the regimes of those 
member states not yet fulfilling the macro-economic criteria but engaged in meeting them 
(the ‘pre-ins’). Outside the EMU, the monetary and economic regime of the member states 
self-excluded from the common currency (the ‘outs’). The Lisbon Treaty has thus 
institutionalized in the same legal framework diverging economic and monetary interests, 
with the assumption that they would converge towards a shared goal of economic growth 
and monetary stability. 
 
The compromise between centralization and decentralization 
There is a third constitutional compromise to consider, this time concerning the euro-
area member states. This compromise consisted of combining centralization (of monetary 
policy) with decentralization (of the economic, budgetary and fiscal policies connected to 
the common currency). The monetary policy of the common currency was put under the 
control of a federal independent institution, the ECB, but the other connected policies 
remained in the hands of member states. Once the process of setting up a road map for 
achieving the common currency was accepted, the German request of a strictly 
independent central bank pursuing an exclusively anti-inflationary monetary policy was 
accepted for the monetary side of the EMU and, for the economic side of the EMU, an 
intergovernmental model based on the voluntary coordination of policies by member state 
governments was chosen, as required by the French government (Touri and Touri 2014, p. 
26-27). At the core of this compromise there was the assumption that intergovernmental 
decision-making, based on unanimity’s criteria, would make possible, for France, to 
balance the influence of Germany (become the bigger country, demographically and 
economically, with the 1990 reunification). This compromise was thus institutionalized 
through the Stability and Growth Pact or SGP (Heipertz and Verdun 2010), constituted by 
a Resolution, two Council Regulations and the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) Protocol 
added to the Maastricht Treaty. The first regulation, "on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
9 
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policies," entered into force on 1 July 1998 and the second regulation, "on speeding up 
and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure," on 1 January 1999. 
The SGP was based on Art. 104.14 of the Treaty of European Community (TEC), part of 
the Maastricht Treaty, that “set out in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure” the 
conditions for ordering the coordination of national economic policies. The SGP and the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) Protocol epitomized the German ordo-liberal idea of an 
economic constitution structured around pre-established legal rules (an idea elaborated 
since the 1930s by the so called Friburg School, Young 2012).  
However, the SGP did not work as expected. In 2003, Germany and France did not 
keep their budgetary parameters (in particular regarding the deficit) within the prescribed 
limits. In this case, TEC, Art. 104.5 prescribed that “If the Commission considers that an 
excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, the Commission shall address an 
opinion to the Council”. The Commission submitted a report to the Council of economic 
and financial ministers (ECOFIN Council), proposing the start of the EDP for Germany and 
France. TEC, Art. 104.6 added, however, that “the Council shall, acting by a qualified 
majority on a recommendation from the Commission, and having considered any 
observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an 
overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists”. The Council, in fact, voted against 
the Commission’s proposal. Under pressure from small member states, the Commission 
then appealed to the ECJ against the Council’s decision. In July 2004, the ECJ declared 
that the ECOFIN Council was authorized by the TEC to hold the EDP in abeyance for not 
adopting a Commission recommendation to start an EDP against a member state (if it 
decides to do that). It thus became clear that the SGP, although it appeared to be a 
celebration of rules independent from political discretion, could not challenge the will of 
national governments, in particular that of the larger member states. Notwithstanding the 
2005 reform of the SGP procedural rules, “the legal nature of the Pact was not 
substantially altered” (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 2). The economic constitution of the 
EMU continued to exclude any imposition on the behaviour of national governments by the 
supranational institutions (the Commission and the ECJ in particular).  
In conclusion, this panoply of constitutional compromises substantiated the paradigm 
of the unitary character of the project of integration. In accordance with that paradigm, the 
role of the various compromises was to accommodate different needs and perspectives, 
on the assumption that they would not become mutually incompatible. From Maastricht to 
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Lisbon, the EU developed as an internally differentiated organization (Leuffen, Rittberger 
and Schimmelfennig 2013; Dyson and Sepos 2010; Anderson and Sitter 2006), able to 
accommodate member states with both different views on the finalities of the integration 
process and different speeds in pursuing them (Piris 2012). The literature (Warleigh-Lack 
2013) has defined the former as ‘concentric circles’ differentiation and the latter as ‘multi-
speed’ differentiation. With the approval of the Lisbon Treaty, it was thought that those 
constitutional compromises would finally be consolidated. The teleological narrative of a 
common fate for all European states seems to have found finally its celebration. 
  
2. The euro crisis and the constitutional conundrum 
The financial crisis has not however vindicated that narrative. Indeed, it has upset the 
complex structure of compromises built within the Treaty. First, it upset the equilibrium 
between the supranational and intergovernmental constitutions. As provided by the Lisbon 
Treaty (Foiret and Rittelmeyer 2014), the European Council has become the true decision-
making center for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis (in particular the 
meetings of the heads of state and governments of the euro-area formalized as the Euro 
Summit by the Fiscal Compact). Because the financial agenda has engulfed EU policy-
making, the European Council and its president have emerged as the true decision-
makers (Curtin 2014; De Scoutheete 2011), not just an institution limiting itself to define 
the general aims of the integration process or to solve the most intricate inter-state issues. 
Given the structure of economic governance set up in the Treaty, the Commission has 
come to play an administrative role, transforming the policy’s indications of the European 
Council in technical proposals. This does not mean that the Commission has become 
irrelevant. Indeed, because intergovernmental cooperation has not been able to overcome 
fundamental dilemmas of collective actions (Fabbrini S. 2013), the governmental leaders 
of the European Council have had to resort to the Commission. Legislative measures (the 
European Semester, the Six Pack, the Two Pack) and new intergovernmental treaties 
have indeed increased the functional role of the Commission (and even of the ECJ but 
also of the domestic constitutional courts, Fabbrini F. 2014) in monitoring member states 
behavior regarding their respect and enforcement of intergovernmental decisions. Indeed 
the Commission has become very intrusive in national policies. 
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At the same time, the EP has been left in a sort of institutional limbo (Crum 2013). It is 
true that many legislative measures were adopted through either the ordinary or the 
special legislative procedures that recognize a decision-making or consultative role to the 
EP, but it is also true that the deepening of the euro crisis has led to new treaties that do 
not recognize the EP as a policy-making actor. Thus, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, a re-structuring of the equilibrium between supranational and intergovernmental 
constitutional regimes in favor of the latter has taken place. With the euro crisis, the 
decision-making barycenter has moved toward the relation between the European Council 
(and the Euro Summit) and the ECOFIN Council (and the Euro Group of the economic and 
financial ministers of the euro-area member states) (Puetter 2012), at detriment of the 
Community method of taking decisions. 
Also the compromise between the UK (and more in general the ex-EFTA area) and the 
EMU member states has been upset by the euro crisis. The two new Treaties (the 2011 
ESM and the 2012 Fiscal Compact) were established outside the legal order of the Lisbon 
Treaty because of the difficulties encountered by the intergovernmental constitution in 
solving the veto dilemma. The objectives that were set out under the Fiscal Compact in 
particular could have been attained through an amendment to the Lisbon Treaty. However, 
the euro-area leaders chose to resort to international treaties for neutralizing the veto 
threatened by the UK government. At the same time, for promoting a fiscal union, the 
euro-area governmental leaders decided not to recur to enhanced cooperation because 
that would have given the Commission and the EP a voice in the project. In any case, to 
prevent future veto threats, those treaties set up new organizations where unanimity is no 
longer needed for decision taking. The Fiscal Compact has even established (Title VI, Art. 
14.2) that, to enter into force, it requires the approval of 12 out of the then 17 euro-area 
member states (and out of the then 25 member states) signing it.  
The formation of new legal orders outside the Lisbon Treaty, although not incompatible 
with the latter (De Witte 2012), necessarily calls into question the constitutional 
compromise between the EMU and the opt-out member states, the UK in particular. With 
the Fiscal Compact, the large majority of member states will come to coordinate their 
economic, fiscal and budgetary policies, leaving on the margin only the UK (the Czech 
Republic, which refused to sign the Treaty in 2011, is now reexamining its position). 
Moreover, the UK is also outside of the 2011 Euro Plus Pact, a political commitment (a 
sort of intergovernmental agreement) between the euro-area member states and several 
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no euro-area ones (as Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia – the 
latter thus entered the euro-area on 1 January 2014) aimed to foster stronger economic 
policy coordination between them. The new organization set up by the Fiscal Compact has 
made evident the distinction (indeed, the conflict) of interests between the euro-area and 
the opt-out member states. The most crucial decisions have been taken in the meetings of 
the governmental leaders and ministers of the member states adopting the euro (Euro 
Summit and the Euro Group), with the pre-ins and the out member states only informed 
about their content (see various Eurocomment’s reports).  
Finally, the third compromise (between a centralized monetary policy and nationalized 
economic policies) has not held up in the course of the euro crisis. Constrained by the 
intergovernmental constitution, the voluntary coordination of national policies has been 
unrelentingly challenged by its internal dilemmas. The answer to those difficulties has 
been a drastic reduction of intergovernmental discretion and its substitution with automatic 
rules. For instance, in the Fiscal Compact, the Commission’s intervention on a contracting 
party that disrespects the agreement has now become quasi-automatic, an automaticity 
that can be neutralized only by a reverse qualified majority (RQM) of the financial ministers 
of the signatory member states (Fiscal Compact, Art. 17). Indeed, RQM was already 
introduced in the Six Pack in 2011, a set of legislative measures aimed to strengthen SGP, 
in particular Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011. Furthermore, governmental discretion 
has been constrained also at the domestic level. In fact, the Fiscal Compact has required 
the contracting parties to introduce the balanced-budget rule at the constitutional level (or 
equivalent), thus limiting also from within the domestic system the possibilities for non-
compliance. The 2003 experience has been learned.  
These measures have brought to the further judicialization of the governance of the 
euro-area, through the formalization of stricter macro-economic and budgetary rules to be 
respected by the signatory states (in coherence with the ordo-liberal economic tradition). 
Financial aid to member states unable to respect those requirements has been 
accompanied by rules of conditionality that have led to the downsizing of their decision-
making autonomy. National discretion has been unevenly restructured, with the debtor 
member states becoming less autonomous than the creditor member states for their 
inability to control the externalities of their policies. Within the European Council (and the 
Euro Summit), a decision-making hierarchy has become evident under the form of a 
German-French (and then only German) directorate of the economic policy of EMU. A 
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policy thus implemented and monitored by the Commission. The German hegemony of 
EMU, however, has led to a diffuse resentment in the southern euro-area member states.  
If the euro was adopted in the first place for preserving a European Germany, the euro 
crisis has brought about the opposite effect, that is, the emergence of a German Europe in 
the EMU. That emergence has been supported by the acceptance, in official statements, 
of the interpretation of the crisis (i.e., due to fiscal profligacy of the south) and of the 
policies to pursue for dealing with it (i.e., fiscal austerity) derived from the ordo-liberal 
argument. In any case, the assumption that it would have been possible to govern the 
common currency through the logic of voluntary policy coordination has been dramatically 
unmasked by the euro crisis. Upsetting the structure of multiple compromises of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the euro crisis has brought the EU into a proper constitutional conundrum. 
 
3. How to escape from the constitutional conundrum? 
If we define as constitutional conundrum a situation where the reconstitution of the 
past is not a viable option, but the path towards the future is unclear, then two outcomes of 
the conundrum might be considered. Both would result from the strategic behaviour of 
crucial political actors. I would call the first as the internal differentiation outcome. It would 
consist in the reconstruction of the unitary order of the Lisbon Treaty, albeit internally 
differentiated on the basis of the measures introduced to manage the euro crisis. The 
action of the EP during the elaboration of the Fiscal Compact, aimed to formalize a clear 
deadline for bringing it back to the Lisbon Treaty (European Parliament 2012; Kreilinger 
2012), constitutes the epitome of the strategy pursuing this outcome. In fact, the Fiscal 
Compact declares (Art. 16) that “within five years at most following the entry into force of 
this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the 
necessary steps shall be taken (…), with the aim of incorporating the substance of this 
Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union,” as already happened with the 
Schengen Agreement. This strategy became the official position of the Barroso 
Commission (2009-2014) and was supported by the main European political parties during 
the EP elections of 22-25 May 2014. Rather than a multi-speed Europe, this options 
implies the institutionalization of a EU based on concentric circles, with different clusters of 
member states participating permanently to different policy regimes with different degree 
of integration. The teleological expectation of a multi-speed EU, with all the member states 
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moving towards the same end but at different speed, is substituted by a EU based on 
structural or permanent differentiations. What matters is the re-construction of a legally 
unitary union whose internal policy differentiations will be sewed up by the main political 
actor. As Leuffen (2013, p. 5) stated, “differentiated integration (is) a political program”.  
If the strength of this strategy lies in the effort to reconstitute a unified legal order for 
the EU, it has nevertheless significant weaknesses. The Fiscal Compact certainly calls for 
its re-incorporation in the Lisbon Treaty, however, for this re-incorporation to take place, 
the consent of the UK will be once again required. An unlikely outcome, given that the 
Fiscal Compact clauses would continue to affect London’s financial district negatively, as it 
would have done at the moment of the UK opposition to the Lisbon Treaty’s amendment. 
The alternative would be to transform the Fiscal Compact in an enhanced cooperation 
within the Lisbon Treaty, but this would require the initiative of the Commission and the 
approval of the EP, conditions disliked by few euro-area member state governments. More 
in general, the conflict of interests between the no euro-area and the euro-area member 
states could not be easily kept within a unitary legal order. The need for deeper integration 
in EMU policies would strain tremendously the common legal and institutional order (as it 
is happening with the banking union). As the House of Lords (2014: 3-4) recognized, “the 
Eurozone is on the road towards greater integration. The implication for the UK are 
immense”. The outcome of the EP elections of 22-25 May 2014 in UK, with the UK 
Independent Party become the first party with more than 28% of the popular vote, shows 
that any step towards more integration within the legal framework of the Lisbon Treaty 
might trigger a definitive rift against the EU in that country. A similar outcome would 
emerge in Denmark as well, where, at the same EP elections, the anti-European Danish 
People’s Party became the first party with roughly 27% of the popular vote.  
At the same time, a concentric circles differentiation would leave untouched the 
intergovernmental logic of EMU, whose decisions have lacked the necessary democratic 
legitimacy for being accepted by the affected citizens of the southern euro-area member 
states. The dissatisfaction at the management of financial policy in the latter member 
states cannot be silenced with the confirmation of their intergovernmental source. In 
Greece, in the EP elections of 22-25 May 2014, the party most critical of the policies for 
dealing with the euro crisis, Syriza, became the first party of the country with 27% of 
popular vote. To increase the role of national parliaments in the differentiated regime of 
economic governance (Chalmers 2013), although desirable (Grencross 2014), will not 
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solve the structural legitimacy deficit of the intergovernmental method. Legitimacy for 
decisions taken at the supranational level should come from supranational institutions, in 
our case the EP. However, not only the EP has been excluded from EMU’s main 
decisions, but its inclusion is constitutionally questionable (Hefftler and Wessels 2013). In 
fact, because the EP “shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens” (TEU, 
Art. 14.2), not of representatives of member state citizens, it would extremely controversial 
to separate (in its internal deliberative process) representatives coming from no euro-area 
and euro-area member states, thus allowing only the latter to have a say on the decisions 
taken by euro-area institutions (Euro Summit and Euro Group). Finally, a concentric circles 
EU would leave intact also the technocratic (ordo-liberal) order of EMU with its 
institutionalized bias in favour of the economic interests and cultural values of the northern 
and creditor euro-area member states.  
If one assumes instead that the euro crisis has irreversibly altered the constitutional 
bases of the EU, then an alternative outcome should be considered. I would call it as the 
external differentiation outcome. In this case, a treaty reform strategy would be necessary 
in order to distinguish, legally and institutionally, the organization of a common market and 
the institutionalization of a euro-based political union. The necessity of strengthening the 
EMU and moving it towards a political end has been recurrently raised by several 
governments or national ministers of the euro-area. For instance, the Westerwelle Groups 
of 12 foreign ministers3 assessed, in a Final Report made public on 17 September 2012, 
that, in order to give EMU “full democratic legitimacy and accountability”, “the possibility of 
treaty reform” cannot be excluded. This strategy has been elaborated by several think-
tanks or intellectual groups although pursuing different institutional perspectives (CEPS 
2014; Group Eiffel Europe 2014; Spinelli Group and Bertelsmann Stigtung 2013; De 
Scoutheete and Micossi 2013; Lamond 2013). The necessity of a euro-political union has 
been discussed also by scholars (Keleman 2014; Somek 2013). The external 
differentiation outcome would formalize the separation already taken place between the 
euro-area and no euro-area member states. A separation that will further increase with the 
completion of the banking union in the course of being negotiated between the euro-area 
3 The Future of Europe Group, known as Westerwelle Group because promoted by the then German foreign minister, 
was constituted by the foreign ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain. 
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member states (a banking union institutionally connected to the ECB in Frankfurt and 
distinct from the European Banking Authority located in London).  
However, to formalize this separation, and preserving at the same time the frame of 
a common market, would meet formidable legal and political hurdles. As Calliess (2014, p. 
21) noticed: “The Fiscal Compact made interesting steps into a special governance of the 
Eurozone outside the EU-Treaty. It is a first step into a new institutional arrangement 
between a possible Euro-Treaty and the EU. (However)…its institutional design is not up 
to the tasks that need to be done in a Fiscal and Economic Union”. The process of moving 
in direction of a euro-political union will be inevitably contrasted in crucial member states 
as France, where in the EP elections of 22-25 May 2014 a sovereignist reaction to the EU 
emerged with the spectacular success of the National Front become the first party of the 
country with 25% of the votes. A euro-political union without France would be unthinkable. 
The same EP elections showed a growing dissatisfaction towards the EU also in other 
euro-area member states of the south, from Spain and Portugal (where the main pro-EU 
parties performed quite poorly) to Italy (where the extraordinary success of the pro-EU 
Democratic party that got more than 40% of the popular vote was balanced by 1/3 of 
voters supporting a panoply of anti-EU parties, from the 5 Stars Movement to the Northern 
League). A distinct euro-political union would not tame, per se, the intergovernmental 
pressure triggered by the euro crisis, unless it finds ways for recomposing supranational 
and intergovernmental logics into a new institutional architecture presiding over all union’s 
policies. At the same time, a euro-political union will have to neutralize the invasive and 
technocratic effects of a governance’s model conditioned by the ordo-liberal paradigm. If it 
has to be a political union, then it has to rely mainly on electoral politics, not technocratic 
or judicial rules, for defining its economic policies. This would also prevent, or obstruct, the 
formation of permanent hierarchies and majorities in its decision-making process. 
If the strength of this strategy relies on the recognition of the legal and institutional 
changes that have already taken place and on the potentialities of giving a proper 
constitutional identity to the euro-political union, nevertheless this strategy has also evident 
weaknesses. To carve out a euro-political union from the current EU, without jeopardizing 
the common market framework or even without risking of activating a re-nationalization 
thrust in many member states, would require a formidable political leadership, in both EU 
institutions and member states, that cannot be artificially crafted. At the same time, the 
definition of the new institutional architecture of the euro-political union would require a 
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constitutional moment that is not at the door, it is difficult to predict and it is even scared by 
crucial euro-area member states (as France). Finally, it would be extremely problematic to 
recompose the intergovernmental and supranational logics in the same institutional 
architecture after a long period of contrast between them. Because both outcome would 
meet powerful hurdles, then it does not seem improper to consider a third outcome, the 
fine-tuning of the status quo. In this case, the constitutional conundrum will come to be 
pragmatically managed according to a muddling-through approach aimed to smooth the 
more evident dysfunctional aspects of the constitutional disorder. 
 
Conclusion 
The article has shown why the euro crisis has brought the EU into a constitutional 
conundrum. The EU has been institutionalized on the basis of multiple compromises that 
were finally formalized in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Three compromises in particular had a 
constitutional character. The first was the compromise between member states holding 
different political views on the EU, the supranational and the intergovernmental. The 
second compromise was between the member states constituting the EMU as a political 
project and those opting out of it. The third compromise was within EMU between member 
states claiming centralization in monetary policy and member states claiming 
decentralization in economic policy. These compromises made possible the pursuit of the 
unitary project of integration. Since Paris in 1952 and Rome in 1957, the process of 
integration has been considered an inclusive and expanding project, within which different 
views on the finality of integration and different speeds on pursuing them could and should 
be accommodated. A sort of teleological narrative has supported this project, assuming 
that its end-process would have been a continent integrated within a single institutional 
and legal framework.  
The euro crisis has called into question these multiple compromises. In order to 
face the euro crisis, the euro-area (plus) member states of EMU have had to introduce 
legislative measures and to adopt intergovernmental treaties that have questioned the 
compromise with the opt-out member states. An institutional and legal separation has 
taken place between the no euro-area and the euro-area member states. The euro crisis 
has also called into question the balance between supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions. The financial agenda has increased dramatically the power of the 
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intergovernmental institutions of the European Council and the Council, at detriment of the 
role of the Commission, the EP and the same ECJ. Finally, the euro crisis has transformed 
the compromise between monetary policy’s centralization and economic policy’s 
decentralization not only in a convoluted system of economic governance, but also in a 
system of economic governance dominated by the interests and views of the bigger and 
creditor member state of the euro-area. The crucial role played by the European Council 
has fostered the hegemony of Germany, whose influence on EMU has however lacked the 
necessary democratic legitimacy for the non-German publics. 
The article has thus considered two outcomes of the constitutional conundrum 
created by the euro crisis. The internal differentiation outcome aims to solve the 
constitutional disorder of the EU re-constituting the unitary character of its legal and 
institutional framework. The epitome of this strategy would be the repatriation of the Fiscal 
Compact back to the Lisbon Treaty legal framework. This outcome would imply the 
formation of a renewed EU based on concentric circles of member states participating 
permanently to different policy regimes. The external differentiation outcome, instead, aims 
to escape from the EU conundrum through the formalization of legally and institutionally 
distinct organizations, thus promoting a euro-political union as a separate organization 
from the common market organization. In this case, the future of an integrated Europe will 
be based on a pluralism of institutional and legal arrangements, organizationally distinct 
and at the same time reciprocally connected. Both strategies would have to deal with 
dramatically intricate legal, institutional and political issues. Both would require the 
exercise of political leadership at the highest level. The future political order of Europe 
(Olsen 2007) will thus depend on whether to reconstitute a unitary organization although 
internally differentiated or to formalize externally differentiated organizations although 
connected in the framework of a common market. However, given the hurdles waiting both 
outcomes, a more pragmatic solution might emerge for managing the constitutional 
conundrum via a muddling-through strategy aimed to neutralize the most dysfunctional 
aspects of the constitutional disorder. 
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